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An Essay on Sustainable Use: Harnessing the Market for Con-
servation and Development1 
Jane W. Gibson
Department of Anthropology
University of Kansas
Introduction
 Exclusion of local communities from the 
ecosystems on which their livelihoods and lifeways 
depend, in the interest of ecosystem protection, 
always results in poverty and very often in ecosys-
tem degradation.  People cannot and should not 
be alienated from their traditional uses of natural 
resources.  Rather, they should be encouraged to 
make sustainable use of these resources, and they 
should be authorized to manage their local ecosys-
tems toward that end.
 These statements concede a market-
oriented development, but one characterized 
by local control over the ways and the extent to 
which community resource managers interact 
with markets.  At the same time, the ambiguity 
inherent in the term “sustainable development” 
should be exploited such that local users possess-
ing ecosystem knowledge can help define it.  What 
must be sustained, at what levels, and for whose 
benefit?  Therefore, contrary to arguments against 
“sustainable development,” it is its imbiguity which 
contains both its conceptual and practical strength. 
 In a recently published article, Willers 
(1994) refers to the “chameleon” quality of the term 
“sustainable” as it is used opportunistically by those 
who would propagandize perpetual growth for 
profit.  Likewise, my own observations in Florida 
include this cynical use of sustainable development 
rhetoric.  Yet , where terms are negotiated between 
local populations and resource managers, other 
meanings and agendas can join the discourse to 
work for a different outcome.  Indeed, research 
 1  This paper is a modified version of one presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, 
March 29-April 2, 1995, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
has taught us that fragile environments and their 
human inhabitants can hope for long-term survival 
only to the extent to which local communities 
retain control over their resources and can de-
velop economically (so as to purchase power and 
autonomy). 
 To make the case for local management of 
fragile ecosystems within which selected resources 
are to be exploited, commodified, and sold, I start 
with the history of development in Florida, with 
special attention devoted to the rural part of a 
north-central county where I carried out field re-
search from 1988 to 1992.  Florida is a particularly 
useful case study because it includes several relevant 
development “projects:” colonial “displacement” 
of indigenous peoples, a voluntary resettlement 
program known more commonly as a homestead 
law, one hundred years of relatively unmediated 
local natural resource management, plus fifty years 
of state management.  Certainly, the particular 
historical conditions for each of these management 
regimes precludes any direct extrapolation to devel-
opment in general, or to any specific project site. 
But the Florida case remains instructive for several 
reasons.  First, the duration of local and then state 
management of, wetland and lacustrine sections of 
Orange Creek Basin, in particular, can still teach 
us something about the potentials of grand-scale 
social engineering carried out in the absence of a 
blue-print for the future.  
 Second, Florida’s historical development 
is based on a continuum of tourism types from 
“ecotourism” to mass tourism.  Early recruiters 
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to the state, many of whom were themselves land 
speculators, advertised Florida’s natural resources 
(sun, soil, hunting and fishing), just as ecotourist 
shills do all over the world today.  In its advanced 
state of tourist development, ecotourism remains 
important in parks and preserves, as well as in al-
ligator management which combines sustainable 
use with conservation investment and education. 
Nonetheless, this is only part of a larger tourist 
industry which also attracts snow-birds and college 
students to beach front condominiums and million 
dollar theme parks.  Thus, in many ways Florida 
can be seen as a paradigm of tourist-dependent 
modernization.  
 Third, the case study material presented 
demonstrates how local control over the extrac-
tion and commodification of natural resources can 
translate into a sustainable symbiotic relationship 
between cultural and biological diversity.  It also 
demonstrates the costs of exclusion from use or 
control of those resources.
 Florida’s development, analogous to his-
torical colonial and contemporary development 
schemes in Less Developed Countries ( LDCs), 
teaches important lessons about large-scale, top-
down capitalist development.  Not the least of 
these lessons—indeed, it is perhaps the most 
important—is that such development can be very 
profitable for the select few who can afford the 
investments.  The importance of this lesson comes 
from its ability to focus our attention on the locus 
of power where development benefits explain why 
the devastating consequences for those pushed out 
of the way seem of little concern to development 
beneficiaries.  
 A second critical lesson is that the social, 
economic and ecological crises created in the wake 
of modernization can be managed through a com-
bination of conservation rhetoric, which vilifies 
those who depend on natural resources for their 
livelihoods and lifeways, and police authority to 
enforce their exclusion.  These lessons are not, of 
course, unrelated.  Advanced capitalism has not 
only channeled vast wealth and power into a few 
hands, but has used these tools to transfer control 
over, and access to, natural ecosystems from “the 
people” (for whom the law says flora and fauna are 
to be held in trust) to the state and to moneyed 
constituencies of resourceful politicians.
 To say that the social, economic and 
ecological costs of modernization are managed, 
however, does not mean that damage to people and 
ecosystems is avoided.  Rather, this kind of manage-
ment may work only for the short term, inasmuch 
as the politics of grand-scale modernization–de-
pendent on the “exclusion principle” (Stocks 
1995)–undermines local interest in protecting 
fragile ecosystems for the long term.  Inevitably, as 
a substantial literature now demonstrates, poverty 
exacts its own price against fragile ecosystems.  This 
fact alone speaks to the need for local economic 
development.  The question then is not whether 
to promote economic development for those who 
live in or near fragile ecosystems, but how to effect 
the structural and ideological changes prerequisite 
to local control over the development process.  The 
case study of Shellcracker Haven, Florida2 offers 
relevant insights.
 Over the course of four years during which 
I conducted field research in Shellcracker Haven, 
I concentrated on the relationship between this 
community’s material, social and ideological de-
velopment in the context of changing state interest 
and effectiveness in natural resource management. 
I found that the families of the town are histori-
cally rooted in an extraction-based economy, that 
emic views of their relationship to the local wetland 
ecosystem incorporated values which included, 
but went beyond, profitability, and that exclusion 
from management and economic use of wetland 
resources undermined local concern for wetland 
protection.
Modernizing Florida
 Florida’s development began with religious 
and military aggression against a large and diverse 
aboriginal population.  The territorial government 
secured its success in these early exclusionary 
2  This is a pseudonym for a town in Florida’s north-central interior where I conducted research between 1988 and 1991. 
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ventures with passage of the Armed Occupation 
Act of 1840, a homestead act designed to attract 
Euro-American families from North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia to the piney woods 
frontier.  Here, settlers would act as a buffer against 
the predictable retaliation of surviving Indians, not 
those driven west into Oklahoma, but those forced 
south into the swamps of the Everglades.
 Shellcracker Haven was one of these buffer 
communities where yeoman farm families settled. 
They produced their subsistence with vegetables, 
a few cows, pigs, chickens and occasional fish-
ing on Shellcracker Lake when time permitted. 
Meanwhile, the young government set about the 
business of further territorial control and market 
development by permitting and subsidizing wide-
spread wetland drainage and railroad construction 
through the Internal Improvement Association. 
Speculators began buying and selling the land 
billed variously in flyers as Florida’s surf, sun and 
soil where buyers could expect great hunting and 
fishing.  
 Thus, Florida’s development 150 years 
ago anticipated today’s ecotourism development 
frenzy.  And, just as LDCs construct roads today 
to facilitate the migration of affluent eco-tourists 
to “pristine” hinterlands, the territorial govern-
ment of Florida subsidized roads, canals, river 
improvements and railroad construction.  These 
investments in infrastructure opened up the in-
terior to settlement, commerce, and control.  In 
1851, the General Assembly created the Internal 
Improvement Board “to manage the swamp and 
overflowed lands,” and  500,000 acres of public 
land transferred from federal to state ownership 
when Florida entered the Union (Tebeau 1971).
 Under the Bourbon administrations3  of 
governors Drew and Bloxham, Florida’s landscape 
changed dramatically.  The Bourbons set the stan-
dard for government encouragement of and nonin-
terference in development.  Lands were sold cheap 
to developers among whom was Hamilton Disston. 
Disston bought 4 million acres of south Florida at 
$.25/acre when the going rate for squatters already 
on the land was $1.25/acre.  Much of south Florida 
was wetlands which Disston also contracted to 
drain by dredging canals in exchange for half of 
what he drained.  In the end, he received over 1.65 
million acres, drained permanently 50,000 acres, 
and “improved” forty miles of canals and rivers.  
 It was also under the Bourbons that, by 
1900, Florida’s railroads extended to some 1500 
miles of tracks, including two parallel lines which 
cut north-south on either side of Shellcracker Lake, 
and one which ran east-west across its northern 
end.  In addition, a spur line extended to the lake 
edge in Shellcracker Haven.  It was no accident that 
Senator David Yulee, who also sat on the Internal 
Improvement Association board and owned stock 
in the railroad, owned an orange grove on the 
edge of Shellcracker Lake.  The railroad shipped 
his oranges, and it made cash cropping for local 
farmers, plus commercial fishing, viable income-
earning opportunities.  
 Cash cropping and commercial fishing 
created other employment opportunities in what 
quickly was  becoming a regionally integrated 
market economy based on exploitation of local 
natural resources.  Crates to ship vegetables were 
manufactured in the next railroad town to the 
south from locally available wood; women har-
vested, cleaned, sorted and packed Ford Hook 
lima beans, squash, strawberries and other kinds 
of produce into these crates.  Women and children 
from the family-owned turpentine still operation, 
which employed their husbands, supported cash 
crop production with their labor.  This cash in turn 
went to the company store and to other small busi-
nesses in the area.  Men and boys also found work 
in local orange groves and on a celery farm nearby. 
Two other families opened stores in Shellcracker 
Haven to sell staples such as lard and flour.  
 A family established a mill on the lake to cut 
cypress for construction of the local institutional 
infrastructure, including businesses whose success 
depended on the circulation of goods, services and 
cash in the local economy.  Milled cypress also was 
used to build a fish house at the end of the peer 
3  Named for the family that ruled at different times in France, Spain, and in Naples.
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next to the railroad’s spur line.  Here, men emptied 
the pockets of seines, pulled in hand- over-hand 
from Shellcracker Lake.  Then they cleaned, iced 
and shipped panfish on the train, in locally crafted 
barrels, to “northern” markets such as Jacksonville. 
 The Depression came and went in Shell-
cracker Haven and hardly made a dent as house-
holds made the transition to a barter economy 
based on the long-standing tradition of interde-
pendence and mutual support among kin groups. 
At least four generations of children had grown 
up with fishing poles and cast nets, watching their 
parents earn their living farming and fishing in 
the wetland basin.  Men earned status and money 
from their work, and women, as they do all over the 
world, secured social relations with friends, neigh-
bors and relatives as they also earned money and 
raised the next generation.  Together, the families 
of Shellcracker Haven built the town: a school, a 
church and each other’s homes, and in so doing, 
they built community.  They married, gave birth, 
loved and fought and, in the end, always buried 
their families in the local cemetery.  In short, by 
the turn of the century, the families of Shellcracker 
Haven were firmly rooted in their wetland basin 
home.
 The transformation of the American econ-
omy after World War II changed all that.  Labor 
became scarce and expensive after the turpentine 
still closed down, and crop prices declined with the 
increased production of large, year-round farm op-
erations in the south.  Most of Shellcracker Haven’s 
small farm operators sold out to a large corporation 
which turned pine trees into paper products.  Only 
one man kept his family’s land by going to work 
for the company.  Another survived by leasing 
company tracts on which he grazed his cattle.  But, 
with these exceptions, only those families engaged 
in commercial fishing, dependent on family labor 
and an expanding market for fresh fish, came away 
intact.
 Then the rising tide of post-war tourism 
took its toll on Shellcracker Haven.  Growth in 
recreational fishing spurred the development of 
fish camps and vacation or retirement homes all 
around the perimeter of the lake, a process which 
ultimately drove lake front property taxes so high 
that most local families were forced to sell.  In 
addition, the sport fishing constituency became 
politically influential as its financial contributions 
to fish and game management increased.  Yet, in the 
state capital at Tallahassee, the legislature seemed to 
dissolve the management agencies it created before 
management problems could be addressed.  The 
growing conservation consciousness in the state, 
facilitated by awareness of the massive wetland 
drainage required by development, demanded a 
strong, competent and adequately funded manage-
ment agency .
The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Com-
mission
 The legislature’s capricious budgetary 
authority and numerous failed incarnations of 
resource management agencies only compounded 
problems of conflicting local laws and statewide 
enforcement impotence.  The solution to the 
frustration which resulted came from the Florida 
Federation of Wildlife (FFW) which, by this time, 
had become active and vocal in its determination 
to eliminate commercial fishing from the state of 
Florida.  This well-organized and well-financed 
recreational user group had the support of the 
Florida Chamber of Commerce (FCC) whose 
members also believed the state’s most profitable 
future lay with continued tourism development, 
and that commercial fishing stood in the way of 
real economic growth in sport fishing and related 
industries.  Commercial fishing, they argued, 
caused the decline in “sport fishing satisfaction” 
by removing bass, the favored sport fish for which 
Florida’s lakes are famous,  with their seines.  Com-
mercial fishermen denied these charges.
 The management agency hired its first 
biologists then and determined to manage fish 
and wildlife on a scientific basis.  They initiated a 
study to determine the relationship between com-
mercial and recreational fishing.  These nationally 
peer-reviewed studies showed that the relation-
ship between sport and commercial fishing was a 
symbiotic one.  Commercial fishermen removed 
carnivorous species, which compete with bass, as 
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well as aquatic weeds which clog water-cooled boat 
motors.  The evidence also showed no significant 
bass by-catch in commercial seining.  In short, the 
needs of all concerned could be met with managed 
seining and regulation of recreational fishing whose 
own growth better explained sport fisher percep-
tions that bass populations were declining.  
 The FFW membership rejected these find-
ings in spite of earlier promises to abide by the 
results of the study.  Instead, they cut a deal with 
management agency administrators.  In exchange 
for an end to commercial fishing, the FFW and 
FCC would deliver their support for a public ref-
erendum on a Constitutional amendment to create 
an agency the legislature could not dissolve.  The 
amendment would provide legal autonomy and 
fiscal security, both of which were necessary for 
uniform and consistent resource management.  The 
Constitutional amendment passed, and the new 
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 
(GFC) set about fulfilling its part of the bargain; 
they initiated the process of eliminating commer-
cial fishing, the social and economic mainstay of an 
uncounted number of wetland-based communities 
including Shellcracker Haven.  
 The GFC effected the destruction of com-
mercial fishing first by firing the chief fisheries 
biologist whose studies proved inconvenient to 
the recreational constituency’s public misrepre-
sentation of commercial fishers as environmental 
destroyers.  Second, they banned seining on all but 
the state’s two largest lakes.  Third, they proscribed 
the sale of panfish.  Yet a central problem of natural 
resource management remained: the inability to 
enforce the rules promulgated by the Commission.
 The GFC thus began to transform its newly 
won fiscal security into development of an effective 
wildlife police force.  Beginning in 1947, the GFC 
appropriated 72% of its budget to enforcement. 
In 1950, the figure rose to $668,000; to $1.3 
million in 1952; to $22.3 million in 1991.  As a 
reflection of the high priority given the wildlife 
police, one fisheries biologist referred to them as 
“the heartbeat of the commission.”  Similarly, the 
agency’s 1980 annual report described the Division 
of Law Enforcement as “the sentinel charged with 
safeguarding this wildlife treasure from those who 
would selfishly abuse it.”
 The GFC began to train more wildlife 
police, buy more guns (semi-automatic weapons 
today), bullet-proof vests, cars, trucks, bigger 
and faster boats to sail across grassy swamps, and 
surveillance equipment, including airplanes, heli-
copters and communications systems.  Now they 
had the ability to put teeth into the authority with 
which they could confiscate equipment used in the 
illegal taking of fish and wildlife.  
 The heightened risks of production under 
the new proscriptions immediately elevated the 
prices of panfish, so commercial fishermen who 
lacked economic alternatives took advantage of 
the more profitable, albeit riskier, market.  Some 
continued to seine illegally, late at night, and in 
boats painted black.  Others developed creative 
harvesting techniques such as “monkey-fishing,” 
which involved a telephone and bare wires.  These 
efforts, as the following description reveals, sorely 
tested the patience of the GFC’s wildlife officers.
 The techniques of these illegal operators along 
with social attitudes held by some of the local citi-
zens make for an almost impossible enforcement 
situation.  To throw a monkey machine overboard 
to avoid arrest by a nearby wildlife officer would 
cost the violator only approximately $30.00 where-
as he may often take as much as $50.00 worth of 
catfish in one night’s operation.
 In more organized operations, the violators 
would transfer all of their machines into an excep-
tionally fast escape boat when approached by an 
officer.  This flat bottom, light boat driven by two 
high horse-power kickers [motors] will out distance 
the pursuing officers and then return to reissue the 
machines when the officers depart. In other cases, 
the violators will work in pairs and when an of-
ficer approaches, they are pursued in a near lateral 
course.  If the officer is able to overtake them, they 
throw the monkey machines in the adjacent boat.  
If the officer approaches the other boat, then it is 
thrown into the original boat.  After a few flying 
transfers, then the machines are left in one boat and 
the sack, which previously contained the machines, 
is filled with a couple of bricks and thrown into the 
other boat.  This boat in turn separates from his 
partner and if the officers manage to apprehend 
this operator, they find bricks instead of evidence.
 These techniques in addition to almost com-
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plete lack of convictions of the violators that were 
apprehended creates a demoralizing situation for 
the officers on duty in the area.  For instance, 
since 1953 there have been thirteen monkey fish-
ing cases made in Putnam County with only two 
convictions.  There are approximately one hundred 
part- or full-time “monkey” operators in the area. 
(Luethy 1956)
 Why, in light of the biological studies, did 
the GFC make the management decisions it did? 
The answer could not be found simply in sound 
biological principles, but rather in the relationship 
between money and power.  Recreational users 
contributed 94% of the GFC’s annual budget in 
1947, a figure which dwarfed the contributions 
and drowned out the voices of the state’s minority 
commercial fishermen as well as the voices of all 
but those legislators who represented seiners of 
the largest scale.  Luethy (1956), who replaced his 
boss, the fired chief fisheries biologist, made this 
relationship explicit.
 [T]he economic and aesthetic values of sport 
fishing are recognized and accepted in present day 
society. . . . Its values far outweigh those of the fresh 
water commercial fisheries.  Recognition of this 
situation has resulted in aggressive and widespread 
opposition by sports fishing interests to any real or 
assumed interference by commercial operations.  
Whether or not this concept is justified is beside 
the point. . . .  Commercial fisheries in the area4  
contribute approximately one-third of fisheries rev-
enue, whereas, sport fishing industries two-thirds.
 By the time I began interviewing fisheries 
biologists in 1992, the relationship between the 
GFC and recreational users of Florida’s fish and 
wildlife had grown so close that GFC biologists 
I spoke to no longer distinguished between recre-
ational users and “the public” the agency exists to 
serve. 
 Ultimately, growth in the GFC’s enforce-
ment budget translated into risks which far out-
weighed perceived benefits of illegal commercial 
fishing in Shellcracker Haven. Fishing families 
reorganized their kin-based production system 
around cat-fishing with trotlines, the only legal 
commercial technology and species left to them. 
Today, they refer to this period in their history as 
“the starvin’ time” when no one could earn enough 
to meet basic needs.  They began to hunt alligators 
more intensively during this period to help make 
ends meet with the hides they could sell.  But here 
too they retained their vulnerable market position 
and made very little from the occasional and un-
scrupulous hide-buyers who passed through the 
town.  
 Then in 1967, alligators were placed on 
the Endangered Species List and again a wetland 
and lacustrine resource they exploited locally was 
effectively expropriated.  Some engaged in “poach-
ing,” and in wasteful and destructive ways.  One 
man told me how he hunted alligators at night, 
took them into the weeds to skin them, and aban-
doned the carcass, including the meat, to rot at the 
site.  This same man explained, however, that he 
felt he had no choice because, as he put it, “I had 
young’uns to feed.”  Such is the inevitable impact of 
exclusion and resultant poverty on the non-human 
elements of the environment.
Alligator Hunting
 The politicization of natural resource man-
agement is inescapable.  The decision to eliminate 
commercial freshwater fishing was based on the 
relationship between politics and economics rather 
than on biological evidence and social-economic 
reality.  Could future management decisions do 
otherwise?  Retrospective evaluations of alligator 
hide sales during this period, as well as rebound 
data, suggest that GFC biologists erred in their 
determination that alligators should be added to 
the list of endangered species.  Agency managers 
again based their decisions on the ideological con-
struction of ecosystems which defined commercial 
extractors as parasites to be excluded in the interest 
of “conservation.”  And again, local wetland com-
munities that had generations of training in the 
ecological dynamics of the basin, were taken out of 
the resource management loop.  Their managerial 
removal of sport fish predators and exotic aquatic 
4  Here he refers specifically to Lake George, the state’s second-largest lake.
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weeds have since cost taxpayers millions of dollars 
as the state has had to take over these tasks.  The 
GFC also had to hire “nuisance hunters” to handle 
the predictable conflicts between Florida’s growing 
human population and prolific alligators.
 When the GFC initiated experimental al-
ligator hunts in 1981, they recruited experienced 
trappers from Shellcracker Haven to educate the 
GFC biologists in the ways of alligators and hunt-
ers.  For seven years, trappers taught program 
biologists everything they knew about alligator 
behavior under different conditions, ways to kill 
them, skinning and butchering methods, and how 
to preserve the raw hide.  They also taught GFC 
managers how hunters could subvert GFC regula-
tion of hunting and marketing.  
 Each participating household earned an 
average of $2700 per year, money which went 
into shoes, boat repairs, trips to the dentist, and 
other necessities of which the community had been 
deprived for years.  In addition to the income, trap-
ping for the GFC also reestablished kin-based ties 
to the basin ecosystem along the same lines as those 
needed in earlier years for cooperative seining.  
 Although the data are anecdotal, it is signif-
icant that during this period, when the community 
ties to the lake and wetland received renewal and 
fortification from the benefits of experimental al-
ligator hunting, a multinational corporation sought 
a permit from the county commission to build 
condominiums on Shellcracker Lake.  Trappers 
from Shellcracker Haven organized and went to 
the county commission and convinced them that 
condominiums would hurt the alligator population 
because of damage to the wetland.  
 GFC resource managers celebrated when 
commissioners denied the permit, but resource 
managers who noted the important connection 
between community trappers, traditional ties to the 
wetland basin, program benefits, and the successful 
political activism could not override the demands 
of the agency’s recreational constituency.  When the 
experiments were completed, the proposed Alliga-
tor Management Program abandoned the residency 
requirement for program participation.  Rather, the 
ability to participate in the public hunt element of 
the program depended on the luck of the draw in 
a state lottery in which traditional trappers made 
up a tiny percentage of the large applicant pool of 
inexperienced recreational hunters.
 The number of applications in the pool 
for the years 1988-1991 were, respectively, 5855; 
20,163; 10,122; and 15,311.  From these pools, 
the numbers of permits available were 238; 229; 
189; and 188 respectively.  Of the 1990 partici-
pants, for which a survey was carried out, only 2 
of 139 respondents relied on commercial fishing 
or trapping for even half of their annual household 
income.  Over 83% said they derived no income 
from hunting and fishing.
 Once again, the state excluded local com-
munities from the resources on which they de-
pended.  This time, exclusion was easier because 
the number of people now living in extraction-
dependent communities were even smaller in 
relative terms, and the enforcement branch of the 
agency had been fully equipped, highly trained, 
and authorized to enforce all the laws of the state. 
Very few dare poach alligators any more, and public 
knowledge of these activities is the result of these 
few having been caught.  Except for a tiny pool of 
subsistence fishers and a few part-time frog-giggers 
and bait-seiners, exclusion of extraction-dependent 
wetland communities is complete in Orange Creek 
Basin.  The lake has effectively been transferred to 
recreational users who visit seasonally, and to the 
businesses that serve them.  
Costs of Exclusion
 The earlier history of Shellcracker Haven 
shows that social and economic detachment from 
the wetland basin-induced poverty and desperation 
as families continued to extract resources illegally to 
support themselves.  The attempt by a large corpo-
ration to build condominiums on Shellcracker Lake 
during the experimental alligator hunts also shows 
how a locally vested interest in a natural resource 
can be transformed into political activism on behalf 
of a fragile wetland ecosystem.  In recent years, 
Shellcracker Lake, suffering from twenty years of 
drought, dropped so low as to precipitate an eco-
nomic crisis among tourist-dependent businesses. 
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Rental boats sat in the mud of drying marinas, and 
lake-side cabins remained unoccupied.  Hydrilla, 
an exotic aquatic weed, exploded into bloom all 
over the lake and clogged the few boat motors on 
the water.  Business at lake-edge fish camps, bait 
shops, stores and restaurants dropped off precipi-
tously.  
 The state responded with Sonar, an $880- 
per-gallon herbicide, to kill the aquatic weeds 
commercial fishermen once removed routinely 
with their seines.  Near the shore, hydrilla rotted 
after the sprayings and sent an unpleasant stench 
into lakefront homes.  Then came the county tax 
appraiser to the towns around the lake to triple 
the appraised value of lake-front properties.  “For 
Sale” signs went up everywhere for the overpriced 
homes and businesses no one wanted on the edge 
of what increasingly resembled a mudhole.  Lake-
front homeowners and business owners organized 
to push for a tax reassessment, to mobilize state 
agencies to help them through the economic crisis, 
and to move the proper authorities—though it was 
never clear who they were—to “fix” the lake. 
 From around the lake, a coalition of 
businesses and homeowners emerged, brought 
together around their concern for their financial 
investments.  Yet these vested interests could not 
compensate for their naiveté concerning long-term 
ecosystem health.  Some wanted to stop spraying 
the lake with herbicides and instead stock it with 
hydrilla-eating carp, a solution plant biologists as-
sured them would transform the fishing lake into 
a barren skiing lake.  Others wanted to increase 
the spraying, a solution which would cost a great 
deal of money and would not accelerate the rate 
at which hydrilla was already dying.  Some wanted 
to raise and renovate the low-water spillway con-
structed when a sinkhole drained one of the basin’s 
lakes in the 1950s.  Biologists pointed out that 
the rate of evaporation was more significant in 
falling water levels than the water leaving through 
the dam.  Others wanted someone in charge to 
dredge fish camp boat ramps and the creek which 
connected the lakes.  
 The Coalition to Save Our Lakes called 
meetings and invited county commissioners out 
to see the problem.  Resource managers also called 
a meeting to which all were invited.  Here biolo-
gists explained not only that the proposed solu-
tions would do more harm than good but that the 
drought-induced drop in lake levels was a natural 
and necessary part of the lake’s ecological cycle. 
To the ears of wetland newcomers, many of whom 
were losing money, such reassurances offered little 
comfort.  They went to the county commission to 
ask for help only to be told that the commissioners 
had no authority over the low water spillway and 
could not determine who did, and that they had no 
authority over spraying, dredging or the introduc-
tion of carp.  To reduce the heat they were feeling, 
however, the commission organized the Orange 
Creek Basin Task Force to study the matter.  
 Only long-term residents agreed with what 
the biologists said because they had seen the lake 
fall and rise before, but this agreement showed 
up only in my fieldnotes.  In Shellcracker Haven, 
where lake-edge ownership had long ago gone to 
recreational users, where seining was prohibited, 
where alligator hunting now depended on the luck 
of the draw in a state lottery, and where trucks and 
boat trailers meant locals could fish on other lakes 
anyway, only three men attended two of the many 
meetings with resource management personnel to 
discuss solutions to the economic and ecological 
crisis.  Their experience had taught them that, 
beyond the point at which managers ceased to 
gain something, those who would make decisions 
concerning the lake really had little interest in what 
lake residents had to say.
 Meanwhile, the Orange Creek Basin Task 
Force met a few times and verbally slugged it out. 
As task forces go, they were probably no worse than 
any other.  They could not make it rain; they could 
not affect the low water dam because no one had 
authority over it; they could not influence decisions 
made about herbicides; they could neither finance 
nor get permission to stock the lakes with carp; 
and they were told by an engineer from the Water 
Management District that another study would 
have to precede any decision regarding dredging. 
At their last meeting, the task force agreed not to 
make any decisions except not to meet again for a 
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year.
 “Ecocide” is a term that describes the de-
liberate destruction of the environment.  Late one 
night, a determined and unidentified interest group 
carried iron rods (“rebar”), professionally welded 
metal plates, and bags of cement to the low water 
dam that a few had held responsible for the lake’s 
low levels.  They filled the notch in the dam because 
there was nothing else to do to vent their frustra-
tion.  The county commission called them outlaws, 
and the local newspaper called them villains and 
vigilantes who showed contempt for the commis-
sion’s attempt to mediate the situation.  Locally, 
and in Shellcracker Haven, the mystery engineers 
were known as heroes and letters to the editor in 
the newspaper countered “the official view.”
 The dam “repair” meant nothing for the 
lake one way or the other.  The drought had already 
reduced water levels well below the notch where the 
muck had dried hard enough to stand on.  Still, as 
an assertion of its authority, the County Commis-
sion determined to locate the culprits and unplug 
the dam.  They could not, however, undo the dam-
age because nothing of the bureaucratic complexity 
which prevented the dam’s earlier modification had 
changed.  They would still need permission from a 
still undetermined authority, and the culprits were 
never caught.
Conclusion
 Shellcracker Haven is one of a growing 
number of case studies which come to similar 
conclusions about the relationship between people, 
poverty and ecosystem health (see Susan Stonich 
1993). Studies also demonstrate the benefits of 
collective management of common property re-
sources, a direct and powerful rebuttal to Hardin’s 
mistaken Tragedy of the Commons (Berkes 1985; 
Posey 1989; Hitchcock 1990; McCabe 1992; 
Stanley 1993).  What distinguishes many of the 
socio-ecological systems which have been studied, 
however, is not shelter from the market, but 
rather, local control over extraction and the dis-
tribution of benefits which accrue from market 
participation.
 Sustainable use as a conservation and de-
velopment strategy is hotly debated.  In addition 
to ethical objections to the “use” of animal species, 
those who oppose sustainable use believe that 
the profit orientation of markets will ultimately 
render any use unsustainable.  Evidence abounds, 
they say, that consumer society has gone mad and 
is destroying its own subsistence base.  Capitalist 
ideologies which promote self-interested, market-
oriented rationality overtly fuel economic growth 
based on unrestrained natural resource extraction 
(Redclift 1987).  Landfills fill up, and new ones are 
opened.  If our species survives long enough, we 
are without doubt creating unprecedented treasures 
upon which archeologists, if no one else, can be 
sustained into eternity.  
 It is this model for development which 
Trainer (1990) describes when he advocates market 
detachment in development strategies.  But this 
model for development does not apply equally well 
everywhere.  Capitalism is a malleable economic 
system, one which local communities such as 
Shellcracker Haven adjust and transform to suit 
their own needs.  Yet consumer society, a culture 
wholly dependent on an ideological commitment 
to scarcity, begins with alienation of producers from 
products, of people from land and other means 
of production.  This detachment, like the notion 
of scarcity itself (Sahlins 1972), is neither natural 
nor inevitable nor, as yet, universal.  Nor must 
local decision-making regarding the relationship 
between production, distribution and community 
development be subordinated to an ideology of 
individual self-interested capitalism.  
 Rather than detaching communities 
from fragile ecosystems and supplanting locally 
informed traditional resource management with 
distanced state-level regimes, a long-range vision 
should direct management policies to secure the 
tie between people and their traditions.  Resource 
managers, developers, and policy makers can do 
this by promoting collaboration between ecologists 
and local communities on resource management 
and economic development, not by wishing the 
market away as Trainer and others would have 
us do.  The alternative is external control over 
resource extraction, production and the distribu-
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tion of benefits by those with little knowledge of 
local ecosystem dynamics, and with no traditional 
incentives to preserve and protect long-term and 
short-term profitability.  Thus, the lesson from 
Florida’s historical development helps us frame the 
fundamental issue underpinning the relationships 
between conservation of biological diversity, local 
cultural ecology and economic development: if de-
velopment is to be made sustainable, local interest 
in and control over the development process must 
first be sustained.  
 Local participation and benefits are the 
minimum criteria for the survival of any social 
ecological system.  And local control on late twen-
tieth century Earth requires money with which to 
purchase voice, autonomy and power.  Tragically, 
the monetization of all human activity may relegate 
those less profitable societies to museums where 
what they could have taught us about sustainable 
use will have been lost.  Perhaps, it is a fitting irony 
that we will have to pay to see what is left of them. 
Yet the vision of community development outside 
and apart from the market economy is a mirage, a 
serpent-free Eden imagined by a romantic anthro-
pology.  Would it not be even more tragic to lose 
all cultural diversity because, in our zeal to protect 
and shield our culture gardens from the corrupt-
ing influence of the snake, we won the argument 
that denied diverse societies the means by which 
to defend themselves?
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